Successive studies have found a persistent gender gap in political knowledge. Despite much international research, this gap has remained largely impervious to explanation. A promising line of recent enquiry has been the low levels of women's elected representation in many democracies. We test the hypothesis that higher levels of women's elected representation will increase women's political knowledge. Using two large, comparative datasets, we find that the proportion of women elected representatives at the time of the survey has no significant effect on the gender gap. By contrast, there is a strong and significant long-term impact for descriptive representation when respondents were aged 18 to 21. The results are line with political socialization, which posits that the impact of political context is greatest during adolescence and early adulthood. These findings have important implications for explaining the gender knowledge gap, but also for the impact of descriptive representation on political engagement generally.
Political knowledge is fundamental to the functioning of representative democracy.
Knowledgeable citizens display higher levels of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972) , are more likely to hold incumbents to account for their performance while in office (De Vries and Giger 2014) , and tend to vote for more ideologically proximate parties (Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk 2008; Singh and Roy 2014) . As such, political knowledge strengthens the link between citizens' preferences and the policy positions of the parties and candidates that are elected to office. In short, political knowledge is at the core of democracy and is 'the currency of citizenship' (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: 8 ).
Yet in spite of its normative importance, successive studies have found that the average citizen-regardless of the country or the time period under examination-has a low level of political knowledge. 1 More seriously, these studies consistently find that knowledge is unevenly distributed across social groups, which entails a risk of unequal representation and a weakening in the quality of democracy (Kwak 1999) . One such inequality is gender, and the consistent finding that women are less politically knowledgeable than men. This gender gap has been observed in studies conducted in the United States (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Dow 2009 ), Europe (Fraile 2014) , Britain (Frazer and Macdonald 2003) , Latin-America (Fraile and Gomez 2017) as well as in broader comparative studies that cover both established and new democracies (Fortin-Rittberger 2016; Grönlund and Milner 2006) .
A variety of explanations have been advanced to account for the gender gap in political knowledge. One explanation identifies different levels of political interest and media attention between men and women as a cause (Fraile 2013) . Another explanation is concerned with the different levels of human capital that men and women accumulate over the course of their lives 1
There is a considerable literature on the topic. For reviews, see Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) , Dolan (1998) , Kenski and Jamieson (2000) .
which they can then deploy in politics (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997) . And a third explanation focuses on potential biases associated with measurement and survey methodology (Dolan 2011; Lizotte and Sidman 2009; Mondak and Anderson 2004) . However, none of these three explanations satisfactorily explains the gender gap. More recently, a promising line of enquiry has identified the descriptive representation of women in politics as a possible explanation.
The descriptive representation explanation hypothesizes that as the share of women elected representatives increases, these new female politicians will serve as role models, strengthening women's engagement with politics. It is argued that this increased political engagement will then encourage women to become more interested in politics, to participate more, and to become more politically knowledgeable (Carroll 1994; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; Sanbonmatsu 2002) . A number of case studies have offered evidence in support of this hypothesis (Fraile and Gomez 2015; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007) . However, the limited comparative work that is available fails to show evidence of a link between women's descriptive representation and women's political knowledge (Fortin-Rittberger 2016) or their political engagement more generally (Carreras 2017; Karp and Banducci 2008) .
In this paper, we argue that the absence of any effect for descriptive representation on the gender gap in political knowledge in these studies is attributable to how it is conceptualized and measured. The current studies measure the impact of descriptive representation across a total electorate at one time-point. Instead, drawing upon the rich literature that has shown that political attitudes are formed during adolescence and remain stable thereafter (Jennings 1996; Hooghe 2004) , we argue that the formative impact of women's political representation occurs when the individual becomes eligible to vote. Our focus on the role of women's descriptive representation among the young is supported by the fact that some of the strongest evidence for female politicians effectively serving as role models come from studies of adolescents (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007) .
Our results, consistent with other studies, find no indication that more women elected representatives at one time-point reduces the gender gap in political knowledge. By contrast, we do find that how well women are represented in politics at the time the respondent reached voting age has a significant effect in reducing the gender gap. These results have important policy implications, by allaying fears that a stronger representation of women in politics will not reduce the gender gap in political knowledge, or in political engagement more generally. A stronger presence of women in politics does have the potential to significantly reduce the gender gap, although we show that such a process will take time and will not occur in the short term.
Indeed, many more generations of female voters will have to be socialized in a period of strong women's representation before the knowledge gender gap will disappear.
Our results are based on an analysis of two large, comparative datasets: modules 1, 2 and 3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the 2009 European Election Study (EES). The first section of the paper reviews the main explanations for the gender gap in political knowledge, while the second section places descriptive representation within the context of political socialization theory. Following a detailed description of the two datasets and the operationalization of the main variables, the fourth section presents the results. After verifying the robustness of our results, we discuss the implications of the findings.
The Gender Gap in Political Knowledge
The gender gap in political knowledge has been observed in a large number of studies, and that appears to persist cross-nationally and over time, leading Dow (2009: 117) to refer to the gap as 'one of the most robust findings in the study of political behavior'. A variety of explanations have been advanced to account for the gender gap in political knowledge. One of the earliest explanations identified the different human capital that men and women are able to bring to bear to understand the political world, and mirrors research which sought to explain racial differences in political participation in the United States (see, for example, Verba, Scholzman, Brady, and Nie 1993). Such differences would appear to have some importance in explaining different levels of political participation: for example, women were traditionally less likely than men to gain a university education, a primary determinant of participation. In addition, there remains a persistent wage gap between men and women (Cha and Weeden 2014) , and the greater proportion of women heading one parent families has made women poorer and men richer (Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006) . The human capital model therefore argues that differential access to resources may explain the gender gap in political knowledge.
The research which has tested gender differences in human capital as an explanation for variations in political attitudes and behaviour has found only limited support. There is evidence that it has been a factor in the gradual shift among women towards a centre-left affiliation, away from their traditional centre-right affiliation (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; McAllister 2011 ).
This has occurred as more women gain tertiary education and participate in the labour force.
However, human capital explains little in terms of election turnout, which has shown a long term convergence in turnout rates between men and women (Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte 2004; Leighley and Nagler 1992) . There is also little evidence that it is a major factor in reducing the gender differences in political knowledge (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997) .
A second explanation for the gender gap in political knowledge is political interest and the associated patterns of media attentiveness. Women have been shown to be consistently less interested in politics than men, even after a wide range of other factors, most notably education, have been taken into account (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997) . Similarly, access to political information through the mass media has demonstrated a distinct gender pattern (McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy 1999) . Once again, however, the research shows that this interest and media attentiveness has only a modest effect in shaping political knowledge (Prior 2005) .
The inability of the human capital and interest explanations to explain the gender gap in political turnout has led some researchers to posit a third explanation, namely the potential of measurement and survey effects to bias the results (Dolan 2011; Lizotte and Sidman 2009; Mondak and Anderson 2004) . One line of enquiry has investigated mode factors, so that the reactions of female survey respondents when asked knowledge questions may be influenced by the gender of the interviewer (McGlone, Aronson, and Kobrynowicz 2006; Robison 2014) . A second approach has examined the greater propensity of men to attempt to guess a correct answer in a political knowledge battery, rather than give a 'don't know' response (Mondak and Anderson 2004; Lizotte and Sidman 2009: 129) . Gender differences in guessing would appear to account for between one-third to one-half of the gender gap in political knowledge (Mondak and Anderson 2004: 510; Kenski and Jamieson 2000; Lizotte and Sidman 2009) . And a third approach has focussed on the absence of questions that relate directly to women's experiences (Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, and Rainey 2014; Dolan 2011) . 2 Research along these lines has shown that women are equally or even better informed when measuring practical knowledge, such as knowledge on government services and benefits (Stolle and Gidengil 2010) . For more conventional forms of political knowledge relating to institutions, parties and elections, however, the gender knowledge gap is sizeable and persistent.
The fourth explanation for the gender gap in political knowledge concerns the descriptive representation of women in politics, which is the subject of this paper. This predicts that as the share of women elected representatives increases, these female politicians will serve as role models for other women, strengthening women's overall engagement with politics. This increased political engagement will then lead women to become more interested in politics, to participate more, and as a consequence, to become more politically knowledgeable (Carroll 1994; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007 
Descriptive Representation and Political Socialization
In studying the short-term effects of women's political representation on the gender gap in knowledge-measured in the year the survey was conducted-previous work has implicitly assumed that political knowledge is contingent on the immediate political context. In other words, it is assumed that the descriptive representation that exists at the time of the survey will translate into a particular level of political knowledge across the electorate as a whole. There are good reasons, however, to doubt the validity of this assumption.
A large literature has shown that aggregate changes in political attitudes take place not in a short time-span but over an extended period. This rests on the finding that following adolescent political socialization, attitudes remain generally stable during adulthood (Hooghe 2004; Jennings 1987) . As a result, society-wide changes in political attitudes are mostly a function of new generations-who are subject to influences from different contexts-entering the electorate (Abramson and Inglehart 1986) . A similarly high degree of stability has been observed when tracing individuals' levels of political knowledge over an extended period. As Jennings (1996: 249) has argued, 'what each cohort brings into political maturity has a good deal of continuity … as a whole the cohorts will not improve or worsen very much with respect to their knowledge levels '. Furthermore, Prior (2010: 763) has shown that political interest-arguably the most important precursor to political knowledge-is exceptionally stable 'both from year to year and in the long run'.
Given what is known about the stability of political knowledge and the important role of adolescence in shaping citizens' political attitudes, it is not surprising that the strongest evidence for female politicians serving as role models comes from surveys of young people. Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) , for example, show that girls are more likely to indicate a willingness to become politically active when women politicians are more visible on the news. Furthermore, Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) have shown that adolescent girls will discuss politics more frequently and are more likely to participate in politics in adulthood if there is a higher proportion of women elected representatives. In contrast, evidence of female politicians serving as role models for adult respondents is more mixed, as we have already noted. As citizens reach midlife, their attitudes are more stable (Jennings 1996; Plutzer 2002) ; it is unlikely, therefore, that a change in descriptive representation, however significant, will influence their political attitudes.
Building on this research, we argue that the impact of descriptive representation should be greatest among adolescents and young adults. In focusing on the impact of variables that capture the political context at the time when a voter first enters the electorate, our work mirrors how scholars of electoral behavior have sought to explain the decline in political participation.
Studies have shown that the level of electoral competition or ideological polarization in the first election a voter participates in can leave a lasting imprint on her political behavior (Franklin 2004; Smets and Neundorf 2014) . We also build on several recent studies which have investigated the long-term effects of women's representation (Beauregard 2017; Gilardi 2015) , in contrast to the study of short-term term effects which has long dominated the field. In the analyses that follow, we investigate whether the descriptive representation of women leaves an imprint on citizens' political attitudes. Our hypothesis, then, is that female respondents who entered the electorate at a time when more women were represented in politics will have similar levels of political knowledge when compared to men.
Data and Methods
Data. To test this hypothesis, individual level data are required that include reliable measures of political knowledge, as well as contextual measures of women's political representation. We use two datasets that meet these requirements and that complement one
another; the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the 2009 European Election Study (EES).
First, modules 1, 2 and 3 of the CSES project (CSES, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c ) cover a range of emerging and established democracies. 3 The data are based on post-election nationally representative surveys that include a common module of questions. Interviews were mostly, but not exclusively, conducted by telephone. Given that differences in survey mode might affect levels of political knowledge and the gender gap in knowledge, we control for the survey mode in our analyses of the CSES data.
Political knowledge in the CSES is measured by three questions, of varying levels of difficulty and specific to the country in question. The lack of standardization means that the 3
Relying on a pooled sample of different CSES module has the advantage of covering a time period of one and a half decades (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , which substantially increases the variation in terms of women's descriptive representation. We do not take into account the data from module 4 of the CSES project because the political knowledge items were standardized, thus making it less comparable to the data from the first three modules. We do value standardization, however, which is why we complement our analysis of the CSES data with an analysis of the EES 2009 data.
question topics vary, although they all cover respondents' knowledge about institutions or government (Grönlund and Milner 2006) . Given this cross-national variation in knowledge questions, it is important to control for topics that women are known to be more or less knowledgeable about. Following Fortin-Rittberger (2016), we therefore control for whether the knowledge items included questions on international relations or on female politicians. Finally, there is variation in question format, with some surveys including multiple-choice questions, others using a true/false or an open-ended format. This question format influences the levels of don't know responses in the surveys, which has been shown to bias the gender gap in political knowledge (Dolan, 2011) . We therefore account for this variation in question format in our analyses of the CSES data. While the EES has a more restricted geographical focus and less variation in women's political representation, the knowledge questions in this dataset have the advantage of being standardized in terms of question wording, question format, and survey mode. That is, the same knowledge questions were included in surveys in all participating countries, all questions were phrased in a true/false format and surveys were conducted through telephone interviews. 5 The knowledge questions included in the 2009 EES were focused on institutions and government, with four 4
We are grateful for Jessica Fortin-Rittberger for making her coding of the question content and question format variables available to us.
5
Though it should be noted that in nine countries in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), representative phone sampling was not feasible. In these countries the sample is based of a combination of face-to-face and phone interviews. We control for this difference by adding a dummy variable to our analyses that identifies these nine countries.
items on European Union politics and three items measuring national political knowledge. 6 As
Fraile (2014) has indicated, the true/false format of these knowledge questions as well as their focus on international politics and institutions might artificially inflate the gender gap in political knowledge. Our interest, however, is not in levels of knowledge but in verifying whether women's political representation explains the inter-country variation in this gender gap.
Measurement. Our focus is on the number of correct answers-rescaled to run from zero to one-that respondents provide on the political knowledge items that were included in the respective datasets. Any inferences from our analyses depend crucially on the reliability of these political knowledge measures. We have validated the knowledge scales by calculating
Cronbach's α statistics for each specific election/country-study. Cronbach's α values can vary between zero and one and the cut-off point that is usually referred to as the minimal value for a reliable scale (i.e., a scale measuring a one-dimensional construct) is about 0.60 (DeBell 2013).
In addition, given that the knowledge items are meant to vary in their level of difficulty, we also Our focus is on levels of political knowledge among female respondents, and how the difference between men's and women's level of knowledge is moderated by women's political The data are available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html were standardized in the EES survey, less controls are needed in these analyses. We add a control for whether a question on women was included and for survey mode (either telephone or a combination of face to face and telephone surveys).
Method. Both the CSES and the EES have a nested structure, with individuals nested in election years and countries (CSES) or countries only (EES). In addition, our interest in the role of the political context during respondents' formative years necessitates accounting for the fact that members of a same birth cohort 9 are more alike. To take this into account, we estimate a series of multilevel models. 10 Our models include variables at the individual level as well as the election/country-level, and we are mainly interested in the estimated effects of the interactions between gender and the variables capturing women's political representation. We estimate a series of multilevel models, with random intercepts to allow different levels of knowledge between countries (Gelman and Hill 2007) . To estimate these models, we employ maximum likelihood estimation. While previous research has indicated that such estimates might be biased when the number of higher level observations is low (Stegmueller 2013) , our datasets are large, with around 36 countries in the CSES analyses and 27 countries in the EES.
To interpret the estimated effects, we present the results of linear models in the manuscript, but we also verified the robustness of our results by estimating ordered logit models (Appendix 6).
Results

9
In line with previous research on cohort-differences in political attitudes and behaviour, we specify birth cohorts as five-year groups, e.g., those born between 1921-1925, 1926-1930, 1931-1935, … 10 We estimate four-level models when analysing the CSES data (individuals nested in cohorts nested in election-years nested in countries) and three-level models when analysing EES data (individuals nested birth cohorts nested in countries).
In line with previous research, the results from the CSES and EES confirm that women obtain a consistently lower score on these conventional political knowledge measures compared to men. is not statistically significant. The CSES data thus offers strong evidence of a gender gap in knowledge as it is conventionally measured. On a zero to one scale, the mean size of the gap across the 106 elections is -0.10.
[ Figure 1 about here]
A similar pattern emerges in the EES data. In fact, here evidence for the presence of a gender gap in political knowledge is slightly more pronounced; the mean difference across the 27 countries is -0.11 (again on a zero to one scale). In every one of the 27 countries that participated in the 2009 EES wave of the EES survey, female respondents scored significantly lower when compared to their male respondents. The largest gender gaps are found in Malta and Cyprus, and the lowest in Latvia and Estonia.
[ Figure 2 about here]
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For formatting the figures in this paper, we used the plotplain package in Stata (Bischoff, 2017 Our expectation is that this last model will show a significant impact of women's political representation on the gender knowledge gap. More precisely, we expect to find a positive interaction effect, indicating that as women are better represented in parliament during a respondent's formative years, the knowledge gap between men and women is reduced.
The CSES results are reported in Table 1 . The first model confirms the importance of human capital in predicting political knowledge, through possession of a college degree and the accumulated knowledge that comes with age. There is also a significant negative impact on knowledge for the quality of the democracy in the country. This may reflect the surge in political interest that accompanied the collapse of communism in 1989-90 in many of the former communist states of central and eastern Europe. Furthermore, the gender gap is larger in countries that have a higher quality of democracy and in more disproportional electoral systems.
With regard to the controls for mode, question content and format, we find a significant positive effect of the use of mixed survey mode. Further, we find that the gender gap is significantly larger when the survey included a question on international politics and when the question format is open-ended, while the gender gap is significantly smaller when knowledge is measured by means of multiple choice questions compared to a true/false format. Adding the descriptive representation of women in model 2, based on the proportion of women elected representatives in the survey year, has no significant effect on knowledge.
[ Table 1 about here]
The addition in model 3 of the level of descriptive representation at the time the respondent entered the electorate and its interaction with gender provides an altogether different pattern. Here, the interaction term is in the expected-positive-direction: as the proportion of women elected representatives at the time respondents enter the electorate increases, the negative main effect of gender is significantly reduced. These results therefore provide support for our hypothesis, namely that descriptive representation does matter in reducing the gender gap in political knowledge, but only when citizens are in young adulthood and therefore subject to the processes of political socialization.
The results also show a negative and significant main effect for descriptive representation-measured when the respondents were aged between 18 and 21. Given the inclusion of the interaction term with gender, this coefficient indicates the effect of descriptive representation among men. We elaborate on this finding below.
Overall, these results offer strong evidence that the knowledge gender gap is significantly reduced as women's political representation increases-with women's representation during respondents' formative years being the key indicator. Graphing the slopes for the two interaction effects in Figure 3 emphasizes the strength of this finding. In the top graph, there is virtually no effect on the gender gap in knowledge for the level of descriptive representation at the time of the survey. By contrast, the estimates in the bottom graph show a strong and consistent effect of women's representation measured at the time respondents were aged between 18 to 21 years.
This long term effect of descriptive representation is almost linear. For example, the knowledge gap between a man and a woman who entered the electorate at a time when no women held seats in their national parliament-as was the case for voters entering the electorate in Switzerland in the 1960s-is estimated to be about -0.12. For those who entered the electorate at a time when about 20 percent of the representatives in the Swiss parliament were women, the estimated gender gap is about -0.09; this gap is further reduced to about -0.07 for those entering the electorate when female representation was 40 percent, as was the case in Sweden in the late 1990s.
[ Figure 3 about here]
We have already noted the potential shortcomings in the measurement of political knowledge in the CSES data. While Table 1 endeavored to take these into account through controls for mode, question format and question content, it is still possible that our findings are caused by a methodological artifact. Accordingly, we replicate the estimates using the 2009 EES data, which used a more rigorous set of common questions across the countries, as well as fewer methodological differences in how the questions were administered. The results of this analysis, replicating so far as is possible the same measures used in the earlier analysis, is shown in Table   2 . The results confirm our central finding, namely that the level of descriptive representation that existed when a woman was aged between 18 to 21 years has a strong positive impact on her level of political knowledge. These results also show that the overall negative effect of descriptive representation-i.e., the effect among men-is noteworthy.
Graphing the slopes of the two moderating variables in Figure 4 [ Figure 4 about here]
Effects among Men and Women
We have already noted the different male and female responses to increasing levels of women in parliament. The graphs in Figure 5 summarize the main results in terms of predicted levels of political knowledge among men and women. These results show that while women's levels of political knowledge seem to be largely unchanged, men's knowledge levels appear to be lower as the percentage of women in parliament increases during their formative years. This finding contradicts the theory that suggests a stronger representation of female politicians will decrease the gender knowledge gap through a greater involvement of women in politics. While our results confirm the expectation of a smaller gender gap when women have more seats in the national parliament, the underlying mechanism appears to be different. The gender knowledge gap is reduced because a stronger political representation of women is associated with lower knowledge levels among men.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Our correlational data do not provide any insights in the reasons for this decline in men's knowledge levels as the descriptive representation of women increases. We can only speculate that descriptive representation works in both directions for men and women, so that a greater proportion of women elected representatives will see a decrease in men's political knowledge. In this scenario, a trend towards gender equality in politics could result in politics becoming less of a 'masculine' domain of interest, leading to men losing interest in the topic. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that more research is needed into the mechanisms that lead the gender knowledge gap to decrease as women are better represented in politics. Our results suggest that future research should focus not only on the effects of descriptive representation among women, but that the effects among men are also an important part of the equation. The results presented here confirm the persistent finding that women have lower levels of conventional political knowledge when compared to men. Using two independent, large scale comparative datasets employing different methodologies to minimize measurement bias, we
show that women have consistently lower levels of political knowledge when compared to men.
Measured across 106 election years in the CSES, and separately across 27 countries in the EES, we find only one instance-Chile in 2005-in which women did not have a lower level of political knowledge compared to men. In all other cases men knew more about politics than women, and the differences were often highly significant.
Our hypothesis is that this gender gap in political knowledge will be reduced by the descriptive representation of women in politics. So far there are only limited case studies which have supported this hypothesis (Fraile and Gomez 2015; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007) and no comparative studies that have shown evidence of it. We provide the first comparative evidence to support the hypothesis, taking a wide variety of potentially confounding factors into account, replicating our findings in two separate, independent datasets, and providing extensive robustness checks. Our results show that increased descriptive representation does not have a short term effect on women's levels of political knowledge. Instead, we find that descriptive representation has a long term impact; it leaves an imprint on young adults who are voting in their first election. This is in line with political socialization theory which has shown that the influence of political context is strongest among those who are in the process of entering the electorate.
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Our results confirm our hypothesis and show a strong long term positive impact of women's political representation on the gender knowledge gap. This estimated effect, furthermore, is roughly about the same magnitude in both of the datasets we employ, confirming the generality of our findings. In addition, our results are remarkably robust. In the supplementary materials we document the results of a series of additional analyses. We have verified whether excluding samples for which measures of political knowledge scale poorly, have used different operationalizations for defining respondents' formative years, have estimated ordered logit models, have added more individual-and aggregate-level controls 13 and interactions with gender to the models and have changed the coding of political knowledge to capture political expression instead of knowledge. As evident from the supplementary materials, these additional tests indicate that our results are largely unaffected by changing the model specification, the operationalization of the key independent variable or the dependent variable.
While we find the expected decline in the gender knowledge gap, the precise effect of an increased descriptive representation of women is somewhat unexpected. That is, our results indicate that the decline is mostly driven by men having lower levels of political knowledge as the proportion of women in parliament at 18-21 years increases. This finding leads us to 12
Note that this effect is strongest among the youngest age-groups (see the additional tests reported in Appendix 11), indicating a gradual decline of the impact of the political context during the formative years as a citizen grows older.
13
At an individual level, we additionally account for political interest, media attention and gender-roles (Appendix 7). At an aggregate-level we have added the per cent of women in the labour force and the per cent of women with a tertiary degree (Appendix 8). We have accountedfor differences between older and younger women by means of an interaction between gender and age (Appendix 8). Furthermore, we have considered whether other contextual differences during respondents' formative years, such as the level of democracy (Appendix 9) or a more general indicator of gender inequality explain the results (Appendix 10).
speculate that as men see fewer of 'their' own group in office they become less politically engaged and knowledgeable. This explanation accords with how descriptive representation influences women, but more research is needed into the causal processes that underlie it, and how it may affect men.
14 Our findings have two implications for future studies of gender and politics. First and most important, the descriptive representation of women matters. As others have argued, more women role models in politics will decrease the gender knowledge gap (Carroll 1994; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; Sanbonmatsu 2002) . Ultimately, such changes will create a more equitable political system and further reduce gender differences in many aspects of political attitudes and behavior. Second, our results suggest that such change will take many generations before it has any significant impact on a political system. Since the influence of descriptive representation is effective through the imprint it leaves on young adults, it will only be when substantial numbers of voters-socialized in a context of strong women's political representation-have moved into the electorate that overall patterns of engagement will change.
For the gender knowledge gap to disappear, not only must more time elapse: there must be a continued and sustained increase in the percentage of women in national parliaments. In the countries included in our analyses, women's political representation has strongly increased over time, from an average of about 5 percent in 1945 to about one quarter around 2015 (see Appendix 13). According to our estimates, however, even with this level of representation, women will still on average have less knowledge of basic political facts when compared to men.
The implication is that in the vast majority of countries under consideration, there is still a sizeable knowledge gap among new voters entering the electorate today. These differences, as 14 Given the limitations of cross-sectional research for establishing causality, experimental and natural experimental designs are a promising avenue for further research in this area.
we show here, have long term effects for their views of and participation in politics, and will persist throughout their lives.
Figure 1. The Estimated Gender Gap in Political Knowledge, CSES
Estimates are regression coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect of being female (reference: male) on a 0 to 1 sum-scale of political knowledge.
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